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I. INTRODUCTION
There is no doubt that Americans love rankings—of practically
anything.1 Whether it is the top forty songs of the week,2 the top
twenty college football teams of the season,3 the twenty-five most intriguing people of the year,4 the 100 best books of the century,5 or the
1000 most important people of the millennium,6 we want to know
who is on top and who is not. The reasons for our fascination are
probably too varied to even list. To name just a few: our society worships celebrity, so we want to know who deserves our adoration;7 the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law and University of
Illinois Institute of Government and Public Affairs.
1. One author calls ranking “an American custom as traditional as price-fixing.” Arthur Austin, The Top Ten Politically Correct Law Reviews, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1319, 1320.
2. See, e.g., Charts: Adult Top 40, BILLBOARD, Dec. 12, 1998, at 80. According to Billboard magazine, Lullaby by Shawn Mullins was the top song of the week.
3. See, e.g., Andrew Bagnato, AP Top 25, THE RECORD, Jan. 6, 1999, at S5. The Associated Press ranked the University of Tennessee Volunteers the number one team of the
1998 season.
4. See, e.g., The 25 Most Intriguing People of ‘98, PEOPLE MAG., Dec. 28, 1998, at 48.
The magazine ranked baseball slugger Mark McGwire as one of the most intriguing people
of the year.
5. For competing rankings, see Random House, Modern Library/100 Best Novels
(visited Feb. 22, 1999) <http://www.randomhouse.com/modernlibrary/100best/index.html>
(ranking James Joyce’s Ulysses the best English language novel of the century), and Random House, Modern Library/100 Best Novels: Radcliffe List (visited Feb. 22, 1999)
<http://www.randomhouse.com/modernlibrary/100best/radcliffe.html> (ranking F. Scott
Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby number one).
6. See AGNES HOOPER GOTTLEIB ET AL., 1,000 YEARS, 1,000 PEOPLE: RANKING THE
MEN AND WOMEN WHO SHAPED THE MILLENNIUM (1998). Johannes Gutenberg, inventor of
the printing press, is ranked number one.
7. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL-SOCIETY: WHY THE FEW
AT THE TOP GET SO MUCH MORE THAN THE REST OF US (1996).
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human condition prizes relative status even above absolute achievement,8 and rankings respond to this desire for hierarchy; and, of
course, people love gossip.
Lawyers, law students, and law professors have attachments to
our educational institutions, so it follows naturally that any attempt
to rank them is sure to attract great interest in the legal community.
The most natural subject of such rankings is law school quality.
When these rankings become ubiquitous and change so little from
year to year that they become predictable, we are bound to look
around for some other yardstick by which to measure bragging
rights. Law schools’ flagship, general-interest law reviews are a
likely target, and attempts have been made to rank them. By ranking secondary—or “specialty”—law journals, Tracey George and
Chris Guthrie (George & Guthrie)9 give us another welcome subject
to discuss around the water cooler. Rankings of law journals are
fun.10
Entertainment and diversion have their place, even in realms of
such seriousness as the kingdoms of law and of academia. But if entertainment were the only value to be served by the ranking of law
journals, the George & Guthrie study would be more appropriately
published in a trade magazine, such as the American Lawyer or the
ABA Journal, rather than in a scholarly journal. To justify the
study’s inclusion in a law review, the endeavor should promise more
than titillation—it should serve an important scholarly objective.
Journal rankings can serve such an objective by creating status for
highly-ranked journals. This, in turn, can lead to competition among
journal editors for that status. This competition can then be channeled in a way that encourages authors to produce more valuable
scholarship than they might otherwise.11
The important question to ask about the endeavor of ranking law
journals, then, is not whether rankings are interesting, but how
rankings can be devised to encourage the future production of valuable scholarship. This essay attempts to provide preliminary answers
8. See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1992) (reporting
that “status” or “relative position” is sought as an end in itself); see also ROBERT FRANK,
CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS (1985).
9. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, An Empirical Evaluation of Specialized Law
Reviews, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 813 (1999).
10. See James Leonard, Seein’ the Cites: A Guided Tour of Citation Patterns in Recent
American Law Review Articles, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L. REV. 181, 187 (1990) (“Ranking academic
law reviews is a thoroughly entertaining exercise. It combines the thrill of competition with
each reader’s deeply held prejudices for his own law school or law review.”).
11. See Russell Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to Coordination
and Collective Action Problems, 77 TEX. L. REV. 403, 415 (1998) (describing how rankings
can create a status competition among law schools that can raise the quality of legal education).
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to this question. Part II describes how rankings can be used to create
a status competition among journal editors that can, in turn, provide
journal authors with an incentive to produce more valuable scholarly
articles. Part III considers the merits of alternative ranking methodologies. It concludes that the desired incentives for editors and
authors are best achieved if journals are ranked on the basis of expert evaluations of scholarly value where feasible, and otherwise on
the basis of the frequency in which journals are cited in other publications.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF JOURNAL RANKINGS: INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF
STATUS COMPETITION
An analysis of journal-ranking methodologies should begin with a
discussion of the effect that rankings are likely to have on the nature
of scholarship published. The cause and effect relationship has two
steps. First, rankings can create incentives for journal editors to select certain types of manuscripts. Second, the journal editors’ desire
to select certain types of manuscripts can create incentives for
authors seeking publication in those journals to produce those types
of manuscripts.
A. Journal Editors
The incentives for law students12 to devote time and energy to editing scholarly journals can be divided into two categories: internal
rewards and external rewards. Internal rewards consist of the personal fulfillment the editor receives from his or her journal activities. Editors may derive satisfaction from becoming familiar with legal scholarship in a field, from completing editing tasks, from interacting with authors, from working with fellow editors toward a
common goal, or, more generally, from having a role in the production of scholarship and the advancement of knowledge.
External rewards associated with journal work could come in the
form of monetary compensation, in-kind compensation, or prestige
derived from the editor’s journal work or position. Few student editors of scholarly law journals are paid for their labor.13 Some law
schools provide in-kind compensation to student journal editors in
12. The vast majority of law journals are student edited, so the analysis will focus on
the incentives of student editors. The handful of faculty law journal editors have somewhat
different incentives.
13. To my knowledge, no student editors are paid in cash for their journal work, although some might be granted preferential scholarship or financial aid status. See Richard
S. Harnsberger, Reflections About Law Reviews and American Legal Scholarship, 76 NEB.
L. REV. 681, 684 (1997) (asserting that many “schools grant stipends or scholarships to [law
review] editors”).
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the form of course credit for journal work.14 My guess, however, is
that for most student editors course credit might be a nice “bonus”
but is not what drives them to accept an editing position (the widespread belief being that far less work is required to earn a given
number of course credits by taking a class than by completing journal work).15
For most editors, then, the most important external reward
stemming from journal work is prestige. Journal editors are viewed
as the elites of the law student world. This status can lead to tangible rewards. Conventional wisdom is that legal employers prize journal editors as employees because journal membership is a signal of
quality, employers consider journal experience to be good training
for legal practice, or both.16 For many law students, journal service
might be the key to securing desirable employment following
graduation.17 For students at elite schools, journal service is often
critical to securing highly competitive positions such as federal court
judicial clerkships.18
To the extent students agree to undertake journal work for anything other than internal rewards, they almost certainly care about
the prestige that accompanies the labor. The position of a journal in
a set of rankings that become established and respected in the legal
community will greatly affect the level of prestige, or status, associated with holding a position on that journal. Thus, a journal’s rank14. Some faculty journal editors might receive a less tangible form of in-kind compensation: credit towards an often ill-defined “service” requirement that is considered by administrators when making decisions on tenure, promotion, and salary increases. This type
of compensation may motivate some faculty journal editors to persevere in their duties, but
the rewards for such activities in the world of legal academics are probably few. See, e.g.,
Afton Dekanal, Faculty-Edited Law Reviews: Should the Law Schools Join the Rest of Academe, 57 UMKC L. REV. 232, 238 (1989) (arguing that faculty-edited reviews can only succeed if faculty editors are awarded more “brownie point[s]” for journal service); Leo P.
Martinez, Babies, Bathwater, and Law Reviews, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1139, 1144 (1995) (stating
that “a faculty member’s participation as an editor of a law review is little recognized”).
15. For an alternative view on this point, see James W. Harper, Why Student-Run Law
Reviews?, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1261, 1273 n.58 (1998) (claiming that “many students” serve on
a law journal staff “solely to get nongraded credit”).
16. See Harnsberger, supra note 13, at 686 (stating that “[i]n the final analysis, it is
true that most students join a law review board because membership is a tremendous asset
in the job market,” although general prestige and personal satisfaction are other factors);
Martinez, supra note 14, at 1140 (calling membership on a law review “that coveted resume
entry which opens doors hitherto undreamed”); see also Harper, supra note 15, at 1274.
17. See Max Steir et al., Law Review Usage and Suggestions for Improvement: A Survey of Attorneys, Professors, and Judges, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1467, 1473 (1992). (“Law reviews
that limit their membership based on grades or a writing competition are, not surprisingly,
widely perceived as giving their members an edge in the job market, as well as in the race
for judicial clerkships and academic positions following law school.”).
18. One study has found that while attorneys, professors, state court judges, and federal court judges consider law journal experience an important criterion in hiring, federal
judges rated it a more important criterion than did any other category of employers. See id.
at 1488 tbl.7.
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ing is likely to be very important to many (if not most) journal editors because it can serve as an observable signal to the external
world the quality of the editors themselves.19
A journal’s position in rankings might be even more important to
editors of specialty law journals than to editors of general-interest
law reviews. Many students who pursue opportunities with specialty
journals do so because they have a particular interest in the journal’s
field of specialty (i.e., international law or environmental law). These
students believe either that (a) they will reap greater internal rewards from work on the specialty journal than from work on their
school’s general-interest law review, or (b) they will reap greater external rewards from such work by signaling their dedication to a
particular practice area to employers seeking specialists in that area.
It is reasonable to speculate, however, that the majority of specialty
journal editors hold their positions because they were not selected
for membership on the school’s law review.20 Consequently, the
amount of prestige associated with positions on specialty journals is
more uncertain than the prestige that comes with law review membership. Most employers probably perceive an editorship with a specialty journal to carry less clout than an editorship on the same
school’s flagship law review.21 In fact, one study found that the attorneys, professors, and judges sampled in the study all rated membership in a general-interest journal as significantly more important
to their hiring decisions than membership in a specialty journal.22
But if a specialty journal is among the top-ranked publications in its
field nationwide, perhaps recruiters would question their default assumption and find themselves more impressed with an editorship on
an “elite” specialty journal.
The relative ranking of a specialty journal is likely to be particularly important at law schools that boast more than one specialty
19. See Korobkin, supra note 11, at 409 (noting that “high-quality” law schools seek
ways to signal their quality to legal employers).
20. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, Law Reviews and Legal Scholarship: Some
Comments, 75 DENVER U. L. REV. 661, 662 (1998) (observing that “[i]n almost all schools .
. . there is the law review; and the second or third journals are, well, second- or third-class
citizens”); Jordan H. Leibman & James P. White, How the Student-Edited Law Journals
Make Their Publication Decisions, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 387, 388 (1988) (“Student candidates
seeking a marketable credential from their law review service . . . will, as a rule, opt to
compete for staff positions on their school’s generalist journal.”).
21. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Ranking International and Comparative Law Journals:
A Survey of Expert Opinion, 31 INT’L LAW. 869, 878 (1997) (“Whether justified or not, a
fairly widespread perception exists among legal academics that the specialty journals are
second-rate operations staffed by students who could not qualify for flagship law review
staff membership . . . .”); Harper, supra note 15, at 1274 (observing that the increased number of law journals means that “employers must note which law [journal at a given school]
an applicant is a member of”).
22. See Steir et al., supra note 17, at 1488 tbl.7 & n.77.
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journal. Employers might assume that a school’s law review editors
are its highest quality students, but how to determine whether the
editors of the international, environmental, or public policy journal
constitute the school’s “second tier” is a perplexing problem. If, for
example, the school’s environmental law journal holds a high ranking while the other two do not, the implication might well be that the
best students (or the best students not on the law review) work for
that journal.
To be sure, all of this amounts to little more than obscured signals, cloudy innuendo, and questionable default assumptions. But
such is the stuff that guides the all-important annual recruiting
dance, during which employers attempt to differentiate between students of relatively comparable qualifications and apparently similar
abilities based on a transcript (often reflecting only two semesters of
grades), a résumé (usually one page), and an unnatural and unenlightening twenty minute interview on campus followed, perhaps, by
a string of equally unnatural and unenlightening twenty-minute interviews at the prospective employer’s offices.
Journal editors motivated entirely by the internal rewards of
journal work should be less influenced by journal rankings than
their colleagues who primarily seek external rewards. Editors can
still reap internal rewards of journal service whether their publication is ranked first, second, or 200th, assuming that the journal’s
ranking does not preclude it from receiving enough article submissions to fill its pages and enough funding from its sponsoring institution to print those pages. But even members of this group are likely
to find their behavior motivated by journal rankings. Most authors
will prefer to have their articles published in highly-ranked journals.23 Consequently, a high ranking can afford a journal’s editors
more choice in the articles they select for publication and the authors
they work with—factors that are important to editors who are interested in “job satisfaction” rather than prestige per se.
In short, most student journal editors are likely to take seriously
the position of their journal in a respected set of rankings. All other
things equal, editors can be expected to respond to such rankings by
attempting to solicit and publish the types of articles that will help
their journal achieve a high ranking.24

23. For a detailed description of why this is the case, see infra Part II.B.
24. A by-product of such a competition might be improvements in the “userfriendliness” of law reviews’ selection processes in order to curry favor with authors. See,
e.g., Robert F. Lusch, From the Editor, 61 J. MARKETING 1 (1997) (implementing a policy of
more timely review of submissions in order “to make it attractive for authors of scholarly
work in marketing to submit their manuscripts first to [the Journal of Marketing]”).
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B. Authors
The incentives that journal rankings could create for journal editors would have no effect on the quality of law journals if authors of
the articles that fill journal pages remained unaffected. Journal editors might alter their selection criteria in an attempt to publish work
that would earn their journal a higher ranking, but their competitors
would do the same. The identity of the articles most desired by journals would shift in the process. The journals best able to capture the
articles prized by the rankings methodology would ascend in the
rankings over time, while the less successful competitors would slide.
But when the dust settled at the end of the competition, the quality
of legal scholarship published by the nation’s broad range of law
journals (good or bad) would remain the same. Prestige would be distributed differently than it would be in a world without published
rankings, but the rankings would have done nothing to affect the
overall value of the scholarship that these publications produced.
Rankings have the ability to create social value, however, because
the incentives they create for journal editors can be expected to alter
the incentives of authors. If journal editors adjust their article selection criteria in an attempt to increase their relative prestige, authors
will adjust the content of their articles because they wish to place
their articles in the highly-ranked journals.
The analysis of authors’ incentives is similar to that of editors’ incentives. Authors produce scholarly articles in an effort to secure
some combination of internal and external rewards. Internal rewards range from interest in the subject matter of their work to
pride in the craft of preparing a scholarly article and personal assessment of its aesthetic quality. For authors who pursue only internal rewards, shifts in the selection criteria of high-prestige journals
are irrelevant, assuming that their work is sufficiently consistent
with external scholarly norms to be published in some journal.
Since authors of legal scholarship, like journal editors, are not often compensated in cash for their work, the external rewards they
seek can be classified as prestige, in-kind compensation, or social influence. All three of these reward categories are affected, to a greater
or lesser degree, by the prestige of the journals in which an author’s
scholarly articles are published. Authors derive prestige in the
scholarly and legal communities based partly on the placement of
their journal articles. The ability to place an article in one of the
highly-ranked journals in a field sends a signal of quality—albeit an
imprecise one—to members of the bar or the academy on whom the
author might wish to make a favorable impression. The reasons that
authors desire to make such an impression range from the intrinsic
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value of building a strong reputation in their field to the hope of cultivating future academic, judicial, or political appointments, or client
referrals.
Academic authors receive in-kind compensation for publishing
journal articles in the sense that such publications are generally important preconditions to tenure, promotion, lateral job offers, and
salary increases. Unlike student journal editors, who generally receive the same number of course credits and other in-kind rewards
irrespective of the journal’s prestige, the prestige of the journal publishing an academic author’s article often affects the amount of inkind compensation received.25 Whereas one or two articles published
in highly prestigious journals might win the author tenure or a
healthy pay raise, more articles published in less prestigious journals might be needed to secure the same rewards.26 Practicing lawyers are often “compensated” for the publication of academic articles
in the form of retainers, client referrals, or the appointment to positions in professional organizations or to adjunct professorships. The
prestige of the publishing journal can also affect the quality and
quantity of practitioners’ in-kind compensation.
The prestige of the publishing journal can be important even to
authors primarily interested in the social impact of their work,
rather than personal rewards. Scholarly articles can have an impact
on the legal or social institutions of society only to the extent that
they are read. In the United States alone there are at least 172 general-interest law reviews27 and at least 330 specialty law journals.28
With well over 500 law journals—and perhaps as many as 80029—
competition for the attention of a limited number of readers is
intense, to say the least. Be they casual readers, scholarly
researchers, or practitioners and judges looking for guidance in
solving a particular legal problem, readers of scholarly journals are
likely to be drawn to more prestigious publications. Consequently,
25. See, e.g., Crespi, supra note 21, at 869 (observing that the reputation of the publishing journal is often viewed as a proxy for the quality of scholarship, and thus, “[f]aculty
members who seek tenure and promotion are therefore well-advised to strive for publication of their research in the most prestigious journals possible”); Friedman, supra note 20,
at 664 (“[T]he law reviews definitely have power—at least within the academy. If the editors
of the Harvard Law Review accept an article by young Smithers, a brand-new assistant professor at the University of North Dakota Law School, they have definitely given his career a
jump-start.” (footnote omitted)).
26. This argument would be even stronger if there were an established set of journal
rankings for the academic community to rely on, as opposed to the current regime of informal and uncertain word-of-mouth evaluations of a journal’s relative prestige.
27. See MICHAEL H. HOFFHEIMER, ANDERSON’S 1997 DIRECTORY OF LAW REVIEWS AND
SCHOLARLY LEGAL PERIODICALS 1-11 (1997).
28. See George & Guthrie, supra note 9, at 824.
29. See Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in Pursuit of Truth and Tenure,
103 HARV. L. REV. 926, 928 (1990); Martinez, supra note 14, at 1142.
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more prestigious publications. Consequently, the social impact of a
scholarly article is likely to be significantly
affected by the prestige of the journal in which it is published.30 This
is likely to be even more true for specialty journals than for generalinterest law reviews, as the former group, despite its greater numbers, tend to be cited far less frequently than the latter group.31
The importance of published journal rankings to authors who
seek to publish in specialty law journals might, in fact, be greater
than they are to authors who aim to publish in general-interest law
reviews. The reason is that since every accredited law school publishes a general-interest review whose staff is assumed to be the best
students at the school, many authors and readers alike probably assume that the prestige of a general-interest law review is closely correlated with the prestige of its sponsoring institution. Most authors
would likely assume that the placement of an article in the Stanford
Law Review is somewhat more prestigious than a placement in the
Virginia Law Review, which is, in turn, somewhat more prestigious
than a placement in the Northwestern Law Review. This notion is
based entirely on the intuition that Stanford Law School is somewhat more prestigious than the University of Virginia Law School,
which is somewhat more prestigious than Northwestern Law School.
My personal (and, admittedly, highly anecdotal) experience suggests,
however, that the same authors would be decidedly less certain
whether an article placed in the Stanford, Virginia, or Northwestern
international law journals would be most prestigious—an uncertainty that could result in greater reliance on published rankings.
The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that authors of
articles destined for publication in scholarly law journals who are
concerned with anything other than the purely internal rewards of
producing scholarship have an incentive to adjust their scholarly activity in ways that will appeal to the editors of relatively prestigious
journals. These editors, in turn, are able to claim and maintain high
rankings for their publications only by altering or keeping their selection methodologies consistent with the incentive structure of the
dominant rankings methodologies. In short, if journals rankings become established and respected in the legal and academic communi30. See Steir et al., supra note 17, at 1474 (speculating that the high relative frequency
of citations of elite law reviews in judicial opinions may reflect the fact that judicial clerks
often attended these elite schools).
31. See Leonard, supra note 10, at 210 (finding in one survey that only three of the 48
most cited law journals were specialty journals, and specialty journals accounted for only
13.5% of the total citations); cf. Margaret A. Goldblatt, Current Legal Periodicals: A Use
Study, 78 LAW LIBR. J. 55, 61 tbl.4 (1986) (finding that 30.1% of specialty journals were
never used during the time period studied while only 16.5% of general-interest journals
were never used).
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ties, they can have a significant effect on the content of legal scholarship produced nationwide. This conclusion suggests that attempts to
rank journals are extremely significant to the scholarly enterprise,
in addition to being an interesting topic for cocktail party conversation. Further, this conclusion underscores the importance of carefully assessing the methodologies utilized in the journal-ranking
process.
III. EVALUATING RANKINGS METHODOLOGIES: GOOD
INCENTIVES AND BAD
Journal rankings can create status that journal editors and
authors wish to capture. Rankings can be socially productive, then,
by rewarding editors for selecting (and, therefore, authors for producing) more valuable scholarship than would otherwise be produced.
In the context of law journals, this statement raises two questions, one of ends and the other of means. The former is what constitutes “valuable” scholarship? The latter is what methodology for
ranking scholarly journals will best promote the production of such
“valuable” scholarship? Answering the first question with a high degree of specificity would require a philosophical undertaking that is
beyond the scope of this Article. Fortunately, a broad and uncontroversial answer to the first question can create a sufficient point of
departure from which to explore the second question. For the purpose of this discussion, I will assume that “valuable” legal scholarship is that which contributes to a more nuanced understanding of
legal rules and institutions or adds new perspectives or insights to
arguments about the normatively optimal set of legal rules and institutions. Put simply, “valuable” scholarship is that which is both insightful and original. The second question, then, can be addressed by
asking what methodology for ranking journals can best encourage
the production and publication of scholarly work that comports with
this definition.
A. Rankings Based on the Identity of Authors
George & Guthrie rank specialty law journals based on the average prominence of the authors of its articles. The methodology is
straightforward. Authors’ job titles or “positions” are ranked on a
point scale.32 An article written by the president of the United States
receives the most points—1000—while thirty-nine other job catego-

32. See George & Guthrie, supra note 9, 827-29 tbl.3.
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ries receive a decreasing number of points.33 Based on this authorprominence scale, each article34 is given a point score and the journal’s relative ranking is determined by calculating its average
author-prominence score over five volumes of publication.35
Numerous challenges could be raised to the design of the authorprominence scale, borrowed by George & Guthrie from an earlier
study of general-interest law reviews conducted by Roger Jarvis and
Phyllis Coleman (Jarvis & Coleman).36 For example, why is a “major
celebrity” due 925 points while a leader of “minor foreign nation”
registers only 800 points?37 Or why is such high status granted to articles signed by U.S. Senators—850 points38—when such pieces are
almost certain to be written by a Senator’s staff member rather than
the Senator himself and are unlikely to include many original insights? George & Guthrie do not tell us and neither do Jarvis &
Coleman. Although justified, such nit-picking is of limited usefulness. Few articles published in law journals are penned by “major
celebrities,” leaders of “minor foreign nations,” or even U.S. Senators, not to mention state governors, CEOs of Fortune 500 companies, U.S. Cabinet Secretaries, appellate court justices of foreign nations, or members of many of the other job categories that are assigned points on the author-prominence scale.39
Given that nearly all law journal articles are written by law professors, practicing attorneys, law students, or (to a more limited extent) judges, the following aspects of the author-prominence scale
are most important. First, law professors who teach at “first-tier
schools”40 are awarded more points than those who teach at second-,
third-, fourth-, or fifth-tier schools (the final category is grouped with
unaccredited and foreign law schools).41 Second, partners at the large
law firms (those recognized in the National Law Journal’s “top 250”)
are awarded more points than all law professors except for those at
“first-tier” schools. All other practicing lawyers are awarded fewer
points than any category of law professor, with the exception that
“lawyer celebrities” are awarded more points than any law profes33. See id.
34. For reasons that are unclear, George & Guthrie do not include articles that are
part of symposia, book reviews, or essays, or student notes and comments. See id. at 829
n.86.
35. See id. at 830.
36. Robert M. Jarvis & Phyllis G. Coleman, Ranking Law Reviews: An Empirical
Analysis Based on Author Prominence, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1997).
37. See George & Guthrie, supra note 9, at 827-29 tbl.3.
38. See id. at 827 tbl.3.
39. See id.
40. George & Guthrie borrowed the tier classifications from the U.S. News and World
Report law school rankings. See id. at 828 n.80.
41. See id. at 827-29 tbl.3, 828 n.85.

862

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:851

sor.42 Third, all federal judges and state supreme court justices rank
higher than any law professor or lawyer (except for “lawyer celebrities” who trump all but U.S. Supreme Court Justices), but lower
state court judges rank lower than first- and second-tier law professors.43 Fourth, law students rank below any law professor, practicing
lawyer, judge, and below even Ph.D. students.44
This methodology has two significant shortcomings. First, it fails
to provide a direct incentive for authors to improve the value of their
scholarship; rather, it encourages authors to pursue more prominent
job titles. Second, the encouragement of title-mongering cannot
plausibly have a significant indirect impact on the quality of scholarship. These points will be addressed in order.
Assuming that journal editors pay attention to rankings, the
George & Guthrie methodology, if widely followed would provide an
incentive for editors to select articles based on the authors’ status
rather than on the quality of the scholarly work itself. Articles written by law professors at high-prestige schools would be preferred to
those produced by professors at low-prestige schools. Submissions by
most judges would be greatly favored and works authored by students or practitioners at all but the largest firms would be virtually
unpublishable. Providing this set of incentives for editors hardly
would encourage authors to improve the quality of the scholarship
they submit to journals. The message would be that judges and professors at top schools will be published in highly-ranked journals
even if they produce drivel; students and most practitioners, on the
other end of the scale, might as well save the cost of postage, regardless of the quality of their ideas. The failure of the George &
Guthrie methodology to directly reward quality scholarship is consistent with the widespread suggestion that law journals would be well
served by adopting a policy of “blind-review” of submissions.45
This is not to say that the George & Guthrie methodology would
fail to provide any incentive for those authors who wish to publish in
highly-ranked, specialty law journals. The incentives, however,
would not be to create more valuable articles, rather the methodology would encourage authors to garner more prestigious titles. Article placement would not likely be improved by spending extra hours
in the library honing one’s arguments, but rather by obtaining an

42. See id. at 827 tbl.3.
43. See id. at 827-29 tbl.3.
44. See id. at 829 tbl.3.
45. See, e.g., Dekanal, supra note 14, at 237 (calling for the establishment of more faculty-edited journals with the decision of whether to publish being made without the identity
of the author being known); James Lindgren, Reforming the American Law Review, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1123, 1129 (1995) (praising blind article selection policies).
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appointment to the federal judiciary or, if that fails, to a top-tier law
school faculty.
This system of incentives can have a positive impact on the quality of scholarship published in law journals to the extent that producing high-quality scholarship can help an author to obtain a job title that is more prestigious on the “academic prominence” scale. For
example, one of the ways for professors at lower-prestige law schools
to obtain appointments at higher-prestige law schools is to write
valuable scholarly articles. For the professor who wishes to publish
in highly-ranked journals, the George & Guthrie methodology would
provide an incentive to produce more valuable scholarship—albeit an
indirect one. Writing more valuable articles can help her to secure
an appointment at a higher-ranked law school, which can, in turn,
help her to place articles in highly-ranked journals.
The improvement in the quality of legal scholarship that this exceedingly indirect incentive might produce is likely to be very small.
It is imaginable that some law professors teaching at low-prestige
schools might be motivated to produce more valuable scholarship
than they otherwise would, on the theory that doing so would help
them to compete for a position at a highly-ranked school, which in
turn would lead to better article placement. But there are already
many incentives for faculty members to compete for positions at
more prestigious schools: higher salaries, better institutional resources, more influential colleagues, etc. There are probably few faculty members who are not enticed by these substantial inducements
to attempt to move up the law school-prestige ladder, but who would
be so induced as a result of the establishment of a journal-ranking
regime based on scholarly prominence.46
Given that ranking law journals on the basis of author prominence is likely to improve the overall quality of legal scholarship
only marginally, there appear to be only two defenses of the use of
that methodology. The first, offered directly by George & Guthrie, is
that the prominence of the authors who publish in a journal reflects
46. The incentives that the author-prominence approach provide to non-professors is
likely to be even smaller. The approach gives law students an incentive to move up the
prominence scale to judge, professor, or, at least, practitioner. However, law students already have sufficient incentives to graduate from law school, and it is highly doubtful that
the promise of better article placement in journals will cause even a single student to
graduate who would not have otherwise. Similarly, many lawyers covet judicial appointments for various reasons, and some might believe that writing valuable scholarly articles
would help their chances to secure such a position. But it is highly unlikely that even a single lawyer who would otherwise not put forth the necessary effort to secure a judgeship
would put forth the effort because of the promise of more prestigious article placement
should she obtain a seat on the bench. Of course, it becomes completely ludicrous to speculate that anyone would seek to become President of the United States, the leader of even a
“minor” foreign nation, or even a U.S. Senator because such a title would virtually assure
the placement of scholarly articles in highly-ranked journals.
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the prestige of that journal.47 In other words, George & Guthrie disclaim the normative goal of attempting to improve the quality of
scholarship with their rankings, and instead embrace the more modest positive goal of reporting the current perceived prestige of specialty journals. This justification is unsatisfactory for two reasons.
First, it fails to justify a higher purpose for the rankings than serving as an interesting topic of casual conversation.48 Second, it seems
an odd way to measure the current, perceived prestige of journals.
Surveying the opinions of journal readers about relative prestige
seems a far more direct way of fulfilling this goal.49
The second possible defense of the author-prominence methodology is that it is tractable. Once the author-prominence scale is established, conducting the necessary empirical analysis is relatively
straightforward, although still time consuming.50 Significantly, student research assistants can implement the data collection methodology with a very high degree of reliability.51 Tractability is not an
insignificant consideration for researchers engaged in the difficult
work of data collection and analysis. At the same time, the fact that a
particular metric lends itself to measurement is not, in itself, an excuse to draw conclusions from it, at least if other more suitable approaches are possible. The next two sections consider other plausible
rankings methodologies that are superior to the author-prominence
approach.
B. Rankings Based on Journals’ Usefulness
An alternative to basing journal rankings on the identity of the
authors who publish in them is to create rankings on the basis of the
usefulness of the ranked publications to their users. This can be done
by assessing journals’ usefulness to the creation of future scholarship
through citation frequency analysis, or by assessing the extent to
which journals are physically consulted by readers. Although the
former method is far from perfect, it is superior to the latter method
on both theoretical and practical grounds. And it creates more desir-

47. See George & Guthrie, supra note 9, at 826.
48. See generally supra Part I.
49. See Crespi, supra note 21, at 871-72, 880 (measuring the academic reputation of 88
international and comparative law journals directly by surveying professors who had taught
in those fields in the previous 10 years).
50. This task is not completely ministerial. Collecting the data does require the researchers to make some judgments, such as who is a “major celebrity,” who is a “lawyer celebrity,” and what foreign nations are “minor.” See George & Guthrie, supra note 9, at 82729 tbl.3.
51. See, e.g., id. at 813 n.** (thanking their research assistants for their data collection
efforts).
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able incentives for the production of valuable scholarship than does
the author-prominence methodology.
1. Citation Frequency
In academic disciplines other than law, journals are often ranked
based on the frequency that their articles are cited in other scholarly
work.52 Attempts to rank general-interest law reviews also have been
based, most often, on citation frequency.53 Citation frequency is not
as simple to tabulate as author-prominence, but it is still a relatively
tractable methodology, and it provides an objective measure of quality.54 More importantly, it provides authors with a direct incentive to
produce scholarly work with a particular characteristic—call it “citability”—that is associated rather closely with scholarly value. That
is, all other things equal, work that is more valuable, in terms of insight and originality, will be cited by future scholars more than work
that is lacking in these characteristics.55 Rankings based on citation
frequency give editors the incentive to select articles that they believe are most likely to be cited by scholars in the future, which in
turn provides authors with the incentive to write articles most likely
to be cited by future researchers.
There are a number of reasons, however, why citation frequency
is not a perfect proxy for scholarly value and, consequently, is a far
from perfect basis for ranking journals. While a citation to an article
can signify that the article was particularly insightful or original, it
might just as easily signify one or more of the following characteristics:

52. See generally Arthur Austin, The Reliability of Citation Counts in Judgments on
Promotion, Tenure, and Status, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 829 (1993) (“Cite counts are an accepted way of life in the sciences.”).
53. See, e.g., Colleen M. Cullen & S. Randall Kalberg, Chicago-Kent Law Review Faculty Scholarship Survey, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1445, 1446-49 (1995); Janet M. Gumm, Chicago-Kent Law Review Faculty Scholarship Survey, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 509 (1990); James
Lindgren & Daniel Seltzer, The Most Prolific Law Professors and Faculty, 71 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 781 (1996); Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the
United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991).
54. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540,
1543 (1985); cf. Olavi Maru, Measuring the Impact of Legal Periodicals, 1976 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 227, 229 (asserting that “only citation count provides a measuring tool for the
evaluation of scholarly literature that is conveniently available and lends itself to quantitative analysis”); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26
JURIMETRICS J., 400, 401 (1986) (quoting Maru, supra, at 277).
55. See Shapiro, supra note 54, at 1543 (claiming that “large numbers of citations to a
publication are strong evidence of its scholarly influence”).
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–

the article states a basic and unoriginal argument found in
many sources, but it happened to be on the current author’s desk
or easy for the current author to access;56

–

the article states a commonly accepted fact that the current
author wishes to make but for which he believes unsophisticated
journal editors will demand unnecessary support;

–

the author of the article is a friend57 or political ally58 of the
current author;

–

the author of the article is someone with whom the current
author hopes to impress or curry favor;

–

the author of the article is well known and the current author
hopes to achieve respect by association;59

– the article states a position or proposition that is opposed or refuted by the current author;60

–

the article makes a unique but completely implausible argument that the current author does not take seriously;

–

the article is on the same general topic as the current article
and thus can be used to increase the current article’s citation
count or citation density, but otherwise has little in common with
it;61

– the article makes a point that the current author finds interesting but is entirely tangential to the current article’s argument; or

–

citation to the article helps create a bibliography of related
sources that might be useful to researchers even though it did not
directly affect the development of the current article.62

56. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 751, 754 (1996) (noting that an article might “become[ ] a convenient or reflexive
cite long after it has ceased to influence scholars or even to be read”); Linda C. Smith, Citation Analysis, 30 LIBR. TRENDS 83, 88 (1981) (noting that articles are often cited “because it
happened to be on the citer’s desk”).
57. See Frederick C. Thorne, The Citation Index: Another Case of Spurious Validity, 33
J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1157, 1160 (1977) (criticizing “[c]onspiratorial cross-referencing”); see
also Leonard, supra note 10, at 190.
58. See Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in
Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 4-5 (1988) (calling citation a “political act”
and advocating making a special effort to cite the work of like-minded scholars).
59. See Thorne, supra note 57, at 1159 (calling these “[h]at-tipping” citations).
60. See Leonard, supra note 10, at 190 (noting that negative citations could mean either that a work is important and controversial or that it is poor).
61. See Austin, supra note 52, at 832 (calling the “numbers and density” the most “insatiable” motive for including citations among law professors); Thorne, supra note 57, at
1160 (criticizing “over-detailed citations”).
62. Many of the citations in this Article were consciously included to serve this goal.
That is, the sources did not influence my thinking, but their subject matter makes them potentially interesting to future scholars interested in the subject of journal rankings and
their citation in this Article will make it easier for these future scholars to locate them.
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If an article is cited for any of these reasons, the fact that it was cited
provides little or no evidence of its scholarly value.63
The existence of these citation motives make citation frequency
an imperfect method for ranking journals in any scholarly discipline,
but the problems tend to be worse in legal scholarship than elsewhere. Compared to legal scholarship, scholarly articles in other disciplines tend to have relatively few citations.64 When use of citations
is circumscribed, scholars must choose carefully what sources to cite,
and citations are, therefore, likely to reveal accurately the intellectual genesis of the proposition that the citation supports. Law journals tend to be so heavily footnoted that citations are anything but a
rare commodity.65 Citations are rarely removed by journal editors,
and publication is denied to few if any articles for containing too
many citations.66 In journals in which citations are not a scarce
commodity, the chance that any particular cite does not signify that
the earlier article was particularly valuable to the creation of the
later article increases markedly. The uselessness of many citations is
illustrated by the finding of one study of citation practices that there
is no correlation between the density of citations within a particular
journal and how often that journal is cited.67 If every citation reflected scholarly value, publications with the most scholarly value
63. One citations counter claims that “citation analysis provides a direct link between
a source and its subsequent use as scholarly authority” and that “[o]ne may reasonably assume that a citation means an author has read the source and considers it significant
enough to warrant a reference.” Leonard, supra note 10, at 189. In the world of law journals, these assumptions seem clearly naïve. See Joseph Goldstein, Commentary, 100 YALE
L.J. 1485, 1485 (1991) (arguing that citation frequency of an article “bears no relationship to
scholarly merit . . . . It is not even a reliable indicator that the work cited was read, let alone
understood by the citer.”).
64. Cf. Austin, supra note 52, at 832 (“Where else but law does one encounter hundreds of footnotes attached to articles?”); David A. Kaplan, The Article in a Law Review
That Included the Most Footnotes Is . . ., NAT’L L.J., Mar. 18, 1985, at 4 (claiming that the
record is 1247 footnotes). Why law journals brim with citations is a complicated question.
Lawrence Friedman suggests that part of the reason may be that there are so many law
journals and so many pages to fill, articles need not be “lean and spare” to be published.
Friedman, supra note 20, at 663. Another reason is probably that the student editors of law
journals believe that a large number of footnotes and citations signal the quality of a submission, whereas professional editors of journals in other fields are sufficiently confident in
their ability to identify the “good” submissions without relying on such signals.
65. Cf. Kenneth Lasson, Commentary, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of
Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926, 940 (1990) (claiming that the “core of the [footnote] problem is the lack of moderation”); Abner J. Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U.
COLO. L. REV. 647, 647 (1985) (calling footnotes in law reviews “an abomination”).
66. One commentator claims that “[u]nder the law journal system authors have total
discretion over their citation agenda.” Austin, supra note 52, at 832. I believe it is more accurate to say that an article’s citation count is a one-way ratchet, with editors often demanding more citations but virtually never demanding, or even suggesting, a reduction in
the number of citations. See Harper, supra 15, at 1268 (stating that “some student editors
ask for footnotes to support every factual assertion and reference to doctrine”).
67. See Leonard, supra note 10, at 214 (noting that none of the 20 most-cited law journals in his study were among the 25 journals with the highest citation density).
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would include the highest density of citations and would be cited by
other scholars most frequently.68
Despite these many reasons that an article’s citation frequency
might not equate with its scholarly value, citation frequency remains
a viable methodology for encouraging improvement in the overall
quality of scholarship for a number of reasons. For starters, some of
the reasons for citations that do not imply scholarly value are randomly distributed and create no undesirable incentives for journal
editors seeking to select the most citable articles. For example, articles are sometimes cited because they happen to be accessible, or
“handy,” when an author is looking to support an uncontroversial
proposition. When journal editors select articles, however, they have
no way of determining which articles are most likely to be “handy” in
the future. Thus, the fact that articles are cited because they are
handy to a future author does not create an incentive for editors to
select articles on a basis other than scholarly value.
When articles win cites for some other reasons, there is a risk
that journal editors’ publication decisions will be motivated by undesirable incentives, but these incentives are less undesirable than
those created by an author-prominence ranking approach. Holding
quality constant, an article by a well-known author is more likely to
be cited than one by an unknown author, because citing the work of
a well-known author can be a way to ingratiate one’s self with the
author or to claim respectability by association. Thus, citationfrequency rankings give journal editors an incentive, on the margin,
to select the work of more famous authors. The incentive to do so,

68. Another problem with ranking law journals on the basis of citation frequency is
that there is no agreement within the academy about which citations should “count” and
how much they should count. See generally Austin, supra note 52, at 835-38 (describing the
problem). Should rankings based on citation frequency count only cites in law journals, only
cites in scholarly publications, only cites by courts, or all of the above? See generally Sirico
& Drew, supra note 53 (ranking journals by citation frequency in U.S. circuit court opinions). Compare Cullen & Kalberg, supra note 53, at 1446-49 (ranking law reviews on the basis of the number of times they were cited in Shephard’s Law Review Citations or the Social
Sciences Citation Index, each of which omits some journals), with Gumm, supra note 53
(ranking reviews only on the basis of citations in Shephard’s Law Review Citations). Should
cites in any journal or court opinion carry the same weight, regardless of how prestigious
the citing journal or court, and no matter how extensively the cited article is discussed? Cf.
Anumpa Phene & Stephen Guisinger, The Stature of the Journal of International Business,
29 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 621, 625 (1998) (creating a “prestige index” that allows publications
to be evaluated based on the quality of the citing journals in addition to the number of citations). Citations are generally used with more restraint and circumspection by judges writing judicial opinions than by scholars writing articles; so perhaps a citation in a court opinion should count for more than a citation in even a highly-ranked journal. On the other
hand, this might inappropriately undervalue the scholarship that has a first-order effect on
other scholarship and, through other scholarship, an important second-order effect on the
thinking of lawmakers.
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however, is far less severe than the incentive created by the authorprominence methodology.
In addition, most of the attempts to rank general-interest law reviews on the basis of citation frequency show that this methodology
produces large discrepancies between clusters of journals,69 suggesting that imperfections in the citation process are unlikely to
have large effects on resulting relative rankings.
The citation-frequency ranking methodology might be especially
useful in the context of specialty law journals because these publications are less plagued than general-interest law reviews by one undesirable incentive that using such a methodology creates. An article’s citation count is based in large part on the popularity of its
subject matter among other authors.70 For example, an article on the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution will probably be cited
more frequently than a superior piece of scholarship on a section of
the federal bankruptcy code simply because more scholars write
about the former than the latter.71 No matter how brilliant and important one’s analysis of the bankruptcy code may be, it is unlikely to
be cited by scholars with no interest in bankruptcy law. The upshot
is that if general-interest law reviews are ranked on the basis of citation frequencies, journal editors will have an incentive to choose (and
authors will have an incentive to produce) mediocre articles on
popular subjects such as constitutional law, rather than more valuable articles on less popular subjects such as bankruptcy law.72
Similarly, they also will have an incentive to select theoretical articles of broad scope that might be relevant to a wide range of future
articles rather than superior articles that focus on resolving a spe-

69. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 10, at 191-92 (finding a geometric citation progression—that is, the number two and number three journals together had approximately as
many cites as the number one journal—in a study of a small sample of articles); Mann, supra note 54, at 407-10 tbls.III, IV; Maru, supra note 54, at 233 (finding that 50% of all citations to journals are to 23 “high-impact” titles, while the bottom 207 “low-impact” journals
account for only 25% of citations); Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of
Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131, 135 (1986)
(finding that the top 10% of journals most frequently cited by the U.S. Supreme Court accounted for 56% or more of all journal citations during two time periods of study and that
the bottom 50% of journals accounted for 10% or less of all citations).
70. See Phene & Guisinger, supra note 68, at 623 (observing that “good articles in areas of the field that currently generate low levels of interest are less cited as compared with
average articles in areas of the field that are generating substantial interest”).
71. Cf. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles from the Yale Law Journal, 100 YALE
L.J. 1449, 1460 (1991) (observing that among the 30 most-cited articles in the Yale Law
Journal, approximately a dozen deal with constitutional law while no other subject matter
can boast more than three of the most-cited articles).
72. One author claims that the highly regarded Yale Law Journal has not published a
single article on the subject of wills in his lifetime. See James Lindgren, An Author’s Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527, 532 (1994).
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cific, narrow problem.73 An observable trend in this direction74 has
already led to a sharp rebuke of the legal academy by respected
jurists,75 as well as scholars.76
This problem is substantially avoided in specialty journals, where
the journal by definition publishes articles only in a single field. No
matter how generally unpopular a particular subject—say, insurance
law—might be, the editors of a journal devoted to insurance law
would not substitute articles on the Equal Protection Clause in an effort to garner more citations. Of course, the editors would still have
an incentive to select articles that deal with relatively popular,
rather than unpopular, areas of insurance law (perhaps even constitutional issues in insurance law) and to publish articles with a
broader, rather than narrower scope, but the subject matter restrictions of specialty journals at least place clear limits on this serious
incentive problem.
2. Usage Studies
Rather than ranking journals on the basis of citation frequencies,
journals could be ranked on the basis of how often they are consulted
by users. Scholars have attempted to use this methodology by monitoring the activities of law library patrons.77 In effect, this methodology awards a journal a “point” each time one of its issues is taken off
of the reserve shelf and examined in a particular library. Similar to
citation frequency studies, usage studies tend to result in large disparities between clusters of journals. A few journals are consulted

73. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 56, at 759 (speculating that a decline in the citation frequency of law and economics articles is due to the fact that the movement has matured, and
thus, its scholarship focuses on narrower issues).
74. See Harnsberger, supra note 13, at 693 (claiming that the ratio of “practical” to
“theoretical” articles in law reviews has declined from 4-5:1 to approximately 1:1).
75. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Judith S. Kaye, One Judge’s View of Academic
Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 319 (1989) (claiming that most academics
write for each other); United States v. Six Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred
and Fifty-Eight Dollars ($639,558) in United States Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 722 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (Silberman, J., concurring) (“I suppose, now that many of our law reviews are dominated by rather exotic offerings of increasingly out-of-touch faculty members, the temptation for judges to write about issues that interest them—whether or not raised by the parties or constituting part of the logic of the decision—is even greater.”).
76. See, e.g., Sirico & Drew, supra note 53, at 1057 (concluding from the infrequent citations of law journals in U.S. circuit court opinions that “legal scholarship is overwhelmingly an academic endeavor of little immediate perceived value to the rest of the profession”).
77. See Margaret A. Goldblatt, Current Legal Periodicals: A Use Study, 78 L. LIBR. J.
55 (1986); Nancy P. Johnson, Legal Periodical Usage Survey: Method and Application, 71 L.
LIBR. J. 177 (1979).
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extremely frequently, and many are consulted only rarely or not at
all.78
Usage statistics might be useful as part of a composite journal
ranking methodology, but standing alone they seem inferior to citation frequency on both theoretical and practical grounds. As to the
theoretical, journals score points in usage studies when they are consulted even if the reader finds their content utterly lacking in value.
An unusually provocative article title or one that is very broad so as
to suggest it is relevant to scholars in many different fields might
score journal usage points that are undeserved from a scholarly
value perspective.79 Requiring that an article be cited by another
scholar to earn points is not a panacea for this problem—law journal
authors often cite articles that they do not believe have much scholarly merit for myriad reasons—but, at least the citation frequency
methodology places the bar somewhat higher: another scholar must
at least go to the trouble of adding a citation to his work for the article to score a “point.”
The practical problems with usage studies are perhaps even
greater than the theoretical. It is quite time intensive to record each
time a physical copy of a journal is used. The existing law journal
usage studies were conducted at a single library.80 Studying usage at
a single library, or even a sample of libraries, will almost certainly
produce skewed results, since some journals with a regional focus
will be consulted frequently in their home region and rarely elsewhere.81 Even more importantly, journals are often consulted in a
manner that would not be recorded in library usage studies. Today,
many journals are consulted online. Scholars in specialized fields often consult off-prints of journal articles provided by their colleagues,
never consulting a library’s actual or an online service’s virtual copy
of the journal. Devising a methodology that would capture all of
these uses would be extraordinarily difficult and resource intensive,
if not impossible.

78. See Goldblatt, supra note 77, at 60 tbl.3 (charting the steep decline in use from
more popular to less popular titles); see also Johnson, supra note 77, at 183 (finding that
10% of the titles accounted for 40% of total usage and that the Harvard Law Review alone
accounted for 5% of total usage). General-interest law reviews are consulted more frequently than specialty law journals.
79. Cf. Goldblatt, supra note 77, at 71 (finding that no correlation between the frequency with which a journal was used and opinions of scholars on the usefulness of various
journals).
80. See id. at 55; Johnson, supra note 77, at 178.
81. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 77, at 179 tbl.1 (finding that the University of Illinois
Law Forum, the Illinois Bar Journal, the Depaul Law Review, and the Chicago-Kent Law
Review were among the top 20 titles consulted at the University of Illinois).
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C. Rankings Based on Direct Analysis of Content
Rather than basing rankings on indirect proxies for the value of
scholarship such as author prominence or citation frequency, rankings could be derived from a direct analysis of the quality of journal
content. At a theoretical level, direct analysis of quality is clearly desirable since it would not create incentives for journal editors to select (and, therefore, for authors to write) articles based on factors
that might not indicate quality, such as an author’s job title or the citability of the article’s subject matter. The question is whether it is
possible to create rankings that are directly based on scholarly quality. The answer is almost certainly “no” for general-interest law reviews, but it might be “yes” for certain categories of specialty law
journals.
1. User Surveys
The most obvious methodology for directly assessing journal
quality is to survey the users of law journals—perhaps a combination
of practicing attorneys, judges, and law professors82—asking them
simply to evaluate the competing journals’ scholarly quality. If such
survey responses were to consistently bestow high status on journals
that published the most valuable scholarship, this methodology
would be ideal. Editors would have an incentive to choose the most
valuable articles submitted, and authors would have a maximum incentive to improve the value of their articles in order to have them
selected by the highest ranked journals.
This approach would face two substantial problems. First, few law
journal users would be familiar enough with more than a handful of
journals in any particular year to seriously rank their quality relative to each other.83 If survey responses were haphazard, the incentives to improve the quality of scholarship that the rankings could
create would be severely undermined; editors would quickly learn
that publishing more “valuable” scholarship would not likely improve their journals’ rankings. Second, even if users were knowledgeable about the journals they were asked to evaluate, their judgments of scholarly value might be inconsistent and vary from year to
82. These were the groups of users chosen as subjects for a major study in the early
1990s on law review usage. See Steir et al., supra note 17, at 1477. This survey did not elicit
subjects’ opinions on the relative quality of different journals.
83. A similar criticism was recently levied within U.S. News and World Report’s annual rankings of law schools by an article in The American Lawyer magazine. The article
alleged that there could be little validity to the popular law school “reputation rankings”
since most survey respondents could not possibly have even heard of all the schools they
were asked to rank, much less know anything specific about them. See Roger Parloff, Who’s
Number One? And Who’s Number 52, 91, and 137?, AM. LAW., Apr. 1, 1998, at 5.
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year. Such variability also would severely undermine the incentives
of editors to publish the most “valuable” articles submitted, because
the type of articles judged to be “valuable” this year might not be the
same type of articles rated as valuable last year.
2. Analysis of Scholarly Value
A superior methodology would be to appoint a panel of experts,
such as law professors, to read and rank journals each year. The consistency problem could be avoided by structuring the panel so that
each member would have a multi-year appointment and terms were
staggered. The knowledge problem could be avoided if panel members would agree to read, in its entirety, each journal that they were
asked to rank. This condition, however, would make ranking general-interest law reviews in this manner impractical. It is unlikely
that gluttons for such punishment could be identified, even if it were
humanly possible for referees to read each issue of each review,
which it probably is not.
Another problem with using experts to evaluate and rank general-interest reviews is that few, if any, potential evaluators are actually experts in the broad range of subject areas covered in those
reviews. Asking a professor with an expertise in contract and commercial law, for example, to evaluate a journal that has published in
the last year articles on constitutional, environmental, and criminal
law is not likely to lead a rankings regime in which “scholarly value”
is uniformly rewarded. Citation frequency analysis, for all its drawbacks, is likely to do a better job of rewarding quality. That methodology at least has the advantage of permitting scholars in a particular field to evaluate the quality of scholarship in that field, at least to
the extent that articles in, say, bankruptcy law are most likely to be
cited by scholars in bankruptcy law.
For some types of specialty journals, however, expert evaluations
might be a feasible rankings methodology. There are only twelve
“law and public policy” journals,84 for example, most of which do not
publish more than two issues per year. A panel of experts might be
able to knowledgeably rank these journals relative to each other. If
the large number of journals in a particular category or the small
number of available referees made it infeasible for referees to read
every page of each journal, the burden could be lessened by requiring
each journal that wished to be ranked in a category to select its top
articles and top student notes of the year for the ranking competition.

84. George & Guthrie, supra note 9, at 824 tbl.2.
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More importantly, since specialty journals publish articles only in
a single subject area, it would be possible to select evaluators who
are, more or less, expert in the full range of articles that particular
journals would publish in a given year. For example, experts in environmental law could be tapped to evaluate environmental law journals. Of course, even a professor with many years of experience in
environmental law will not be an expert in every one of the field’s
subspecialties, and even the most expert of scholars will have her
own personal biases and eccentricities; therefore, expert evaluations
will not be a perfect proxy for a journal’s inherent scholarly value.
Nonetheless, expert evaluations of journals that focus on a limited
scope of subject matter might prove a better proxy for scholarly
value than will citation frequency.
IV. CONCLUSION: LOST VALUE IN THE CURRENT SYSTEM
Attempts to rank law journals are highly entertaining, but this
fact should not obscure the intellectual significance of such efforts.
Rankings have the potential to create incentives for journal editors
to select (and, therefore, for authors to create) more valuable scholarship than the academy would otherwise enjoy. The comprehensive
rankings of specialty journals created by George & Guthrie85 provide
an opportunity to seriously debate what methodology or methodologies would ensure that rankings create as much scholarly value as
possible.
Theoretically, the optimal way to rank journals is by directly
evaluating their scholarly value. This provides journal editors with
an incentive to select the most valuable submissions, which in turn
provides authors with an incentive to produce scholarship with the
highest possible value. Where a limited number of publications specialize in a specific, defined area of legal scholarship, direct evaluation may be accomplished by subject matter experts with actual
knowledge of the scholarship published by all the competing journals. In the case of general-interest law reviews and perhaps the
more popular or broader specialty journal subject areas, such as international law, this approach is not feasible, and another ranking
methodology must be selected.
Of the methods for indirectly evaluating a journal’s scholarly
value, citation frequency analysis promises to create the best incentives for the production of more valuable scholarship. This methodology gives journal editors the incentive to select articles for publication that are most likely to be cited in the future. This methodology
85. A recent study attempts to rank a subset of specialty journals—those specializing
in international or comparative law. See Crespi, supra note 21.
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is imperfect, as the most cited articles are not necessarily the most
valuable ones. The methodology creates an incentive, for example,
for journals to publish articles on popular subjects, even if this
means accepting pieces of marginally lower quality than available
articles on less popular topics. This incentive, however, is substantially mitigated in the context of specialty journals by virtue of the
journals’ own subject matter limitations.
Ranking journals on the basis of author prominence is the least
desirable methodology. Although this approach provides some very
indirect incentives for authors to improve the quality of their scholarship, the primary incentive that it creates is for authors to seek
out higher-status job titles.
The positive effect that an established and respected set of rankings can have on the quality of legal scholarship suggests, by implication, that potential value is not being captured in a world without
such a set of rankings. To date, the legal academy has failed to adopt
a consensus-rankings methodology for law journals, and a leading
set of rankings, comparable to the U.S. News and World Report
rankings of law schools, has failed to emerge. In the absence of clear
status incentives for law journal editors to publish scholarly articles
with certain attributes, editors can be expected to seek to maximize
their internal rewards from journal service by selecting articles that
they find most interesting and would, therefore, prefer to edit.
The personal preferences of journal editors probably drive the
current law journal article selection process. Although this is a difficult assertion to prove, it is consistent with empirical studies and the
conventional wisdom among professors who routinely publish in law
journals. One study of law review editorial practices found that different reviews maintain varied article evaluation standards, if they
maintain any particular standards at all.86 The same study found
that the typical law review executive board selects the editors responsible for making publication decisions based more on personality
and managerial ability than on interest in scholarship or intellectual
ability.87 A study of law review scholarship found that highlyregarded reviews tend to publish a disproportionate number of articles by faculty members at their own institutions.88 None of these
86. See Leibman & White, supra note 20, at 414-15.
87. See id. at 398-99. The authors of the study recommended that the qualifications of
student editors who make the publication decisions be improved by separating the selection
and production functions of law reviews and appointing those editors responsible for selection on the basis of interest in scholarship and intellectual ability, as determined from
grades and faculty recommendations.
88. See Ira Mark Ellman, A Comparison of Law Faculty Production in Leading Law
Reviews, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 681, 684-85 tbl.2 (1983). Ellman notes correctly that his data
leave unclear whether there is a “significant relaxation of normal evaluative procedures for
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findings are consistent with the premise that law journal editors attempt to maximize their prestige by selecting articles that satisfy an
external standard of quality. Neither is the general sense among
scholars who publish in law journals that whether a strong article
will be selected by a particular journal is largely random and that
the best articles are consequently distributed among many journals.89
If the lack of a respected set of rankings of law journals minimizes
editors’ incentives to select articles that satisfy some agreed-upon
proxy for scholarly value, thereby increasing incentives for editors to
maximize the internal rewards of journal service, one consequence is
that the scholarship being published by law journals might not be as
valuable as it could be.90 It follows that the academy stands to capture the rewards of improved scholarships if it is able to debate and
reach consensus on an approach to ranking law journals.

home faculty submissions,” id. at 692, but it seems unlikely that “home” faculty members
provide such a disproportionate amount of the most valuable scholarship that the journals
studied have the ability to publish.
89. See, e.g., George L. Priest, Triumphs or Failings of Modern Legal Scholarship and
the Conditions of Its Production, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 725, 727-28 (1992) (asserting that the
selection of articles by law journals is based more on editor preferences than merit, leading
to an element of randomness of article allocation among journals); Martinez, supra note 14,
at 1142-43 (claiming that “there is a real perception that the selection of articles is not scientifically weighted toward the best a particular journal can publish” and that “any sense of
purpose is overwhelmed by the randomness which reigns”).
90. Although virtually no one questions that some law journal scholarship is very
valuable, the average or overall quality of legal scholarship is often questioned. See, e.g.,
Robert L. Bard, Scholarship, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 242, 244 (1981) (questioning the quality of
90% of what is printed in law journals and claiming that “the idea content of most legal
scholarship is extremely thin”).

